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Abstract 
A prominent view in contemporary philosophy of technology suggests that 
more technology implies more possibilities and, therefore, more 
responsibilities. Consequently, the question ‘What technology?’ is discussed 
primarily on the backdrop of assessing, assigning, and avoiding technology-
borne culpability. The view is reminiscent of the Olympian gods’ vengeful 
and harsh reaction to Prometheus’ play with fire. However, the Olympian 
view leaves unexplained how technologies increase possibilities. Also, if 
Olympians are right, endorsing their view will at some point demand 
putting a halt to technological development, which is absurd. Hence, we 
defend an alternative perspective on the relationship between responsibility 
and technology: Our Promethean view recognises technology as the result of 
collective, forward-looking responsibility and not only as a cause thereof. 
Several examples illustrate that technologies are not always the right 
means to tackle human vulnerabilities. Together, these arguments prompt 
a change in focus from the question ‘What technology?’ to ‘Why technology?’ 
*** 
1 Introduction1 
Prometheus played with fire, and thus enraged the gods. His punishment iseternal 
pain, soul-wrenching not only for its physical hardship but because he is bereft of 
any hope of betterment. His play with fire, which ushered humanity out of 
darkness and into civilisation, the first use of technology in Greek mythology, left 
him with a responsibility that even a titan is incapable of bearing. Technology 
 
1 Both authors contributed equally to this essay. Martin Sand’s contribution to this essay is 
part of the research project Moral Luck in Science and Innovation, which is financially supported 
by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie 
Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement 707404. Michael Klenk’s contribution is part of the research 
programme Value Change, funded by the European Research Council under the Horizon 2020 
programme under grant agreement 788321. We thank our colleagues Maarten Franssen and Ibo 
van de Poel for helpful feedback on an earlier draft.  
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creates responsibility, or so goes the moral of the myth. Of course, that is only 
when we side with the Olympians and see Prometheus as an ignoble one, who 
shared with lesser beings what belongs exclusively to the gods. From this 
perspective, punishing Prometheus seems justified indeed. 
Until today, the Olympian view attracts adherents. Many philosophers 
continue to stress that greater technology implies greater responsibility: We 
haven’t held power to destroy the world before the emergence of nuclear weapons, 
and until the advent of air travel, we could not travel across the globe within short 
periods.2 These technologies have changed what is possible and, for many people, 
they broadened the scope of action and misdeed, thereby creating new 
responsibilities, as we will explain in more detail in section 2. 
We will present another view on Prometheus’ plight, which prompts to shift 
the focus from the question ‘What technology?’ to ‘Why technology?’ The question 
‘What technology?’ insinuates that technology is the optima ratio for a wide 
spectrum of grand challenges and societal problems: One must decide which 
technology to produce and how to design it. While the Olympian view is utterly 
incomplete as we will argue, it can be shown that ‘technology no more’ is what 
ultimately follows from their perspective. The reason is that technology features 
as the primary driver of increasing (moral) responsibilities, and the view 
prescribes that our primary obligation is to remain blameless vis-à-vis our 
backward-looking moral responsibility. But this, on the view’s terms, cannot be 
fulfilled. We cannot shoulder responsibility (and, hence, technology) ad infinitum; 
eventually, blame lies ahead. ‘What technology?’ transforms to ‘Why technology?’, 
as we discuss in section 3. 
We will then, in section 4, remediate the incomplete Olympian position with 
the ‘Promethean view’, which suggests that responsibility comes first and 
technology second: Prometheus embraced a forward-looking responsibility to 
increase human flourishing when sharing the power of fire. Instead of seeing 
responsibility as an implication of technological progress, technological progress 
 
2 Maarten Franssen, Gert-Jan Lokhorst, Ibo van de Poel: Philosophy of Technology, 
in: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2018 Edition 2018. 
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must be seen, first and foremost, as a result of responsible acting. Once this 
relationship is more adequately characterised in this manner, we arrive again at 
the question ‘Why technology?’, this time from a different direction. The forward-
looking responsibility that often motivates the quest for new technologies requires 
first to understand the problems to which technologies should respond properly 
and to then assess whether technologies are the right means to resolve them. 
Thus, we stress an important question, which is currently uncritically adopted by 
scholars who promote to innovate more responsible (responsible research and 
innovation: RRI) and by those who recommend embedding values in the design of 
new technologies (value-sensitive design: VSD): Both focus on the question ‘What 
technologies?’ instead of ‘Why technologies?’ 
Considering Prometheus’ legacy critically thus leads to a more 
comprehensive picture of the relationship between technology and responsibility. 
Only a view that puts responsibility first and technology second can adequately 
answer ‘What technology?’ by answering ‘Why technology?’ beforehand.  
2 The Olympian View 
The Olympian perspective is compelling at its surface. Thanks to technology, we 
seem able to do more things than ever. Focusing on technology-borne 
responsibility seems relevant, too. Failures to anticipate and consider the 
consequences of technological development frequently led to catastrophe, as 
epitomised by Oppenheimer’s haunted face and his aghast realisation upon 
witnessing the detonation of the first nuclear bomb that he has “become death, the 
destroyer of worlds” (The Decision to Drop the Bomb 1965). Before we turn to our 
criticism of the Olympian view, we will introduce it in more detail.  
Hans Jonas, probably the most prominent philosopher to champion the view 
that increasing technological possibilities imply increasing moral responsibilities 
and the need for new principles and duties to do justice to technologies’ demands 
and human powers, writes:3 
 
3 Hans Jonas: Technology and Responsibility. Reflections on the New Tasks of Ethics, 
in: Social Research, 40 (1973), I. 1, p. 38. 
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Modern technology has introduced actions of such novel scale, objects, and 
consequences that the framework of former ethics can no longer contain 
them. […] The [sphere of human interaction] is overshadowed by a growing 
realm of collective action where doer, deed, and effect, are no longer the 
same as they were in the proximate sphere, and which by the enormity of 
its powers forces upon ethics a new dimension of responsibility never dreamt 
of before.  
The source of the “expanding relationship” between technology and 
responsibility lies in the “increased technological power” that comes “with various 
technical activities.”4 In the same year in which American philosopher of 
technology Carl Mitcham proposed this argument, Kurt Bayertz stated that the 
“expanding relationship” between technology and responsibility is a constant in 
human history. Growing power over nature and the subsequent growing 
responsibility is constitutive for human history and human nature:5 
Human history can, therefore, be seen as a process of constantly increasing 
responsibility. From its parochial beginnings, humanity today has reached 
a stage of nearly universal responsibility: by enabling us to manipulate not 
only some small and isolated parts but almost the totality of terrestrial 
nature, modern technology has incorporated the whole biosphere of our 
planet into what we are responsible for. 
There is both observation and prescription in these statements; a claim about 
our de facto increased responsibility and a prescribed caution against mistreating 
our responsibility, a claim foreshadowed by the Olympian gods. Contemporary 
philosophy of technology still wags the warning finger of the gods. Peter-Paul 
Verbeek, for instance, uses the example of genetic diagnostic tests for hereditary 
forms of breast cancer, which can be employed to investigate the likelihood of 
someone developing a form of cancer, to stress the same point. He argues that the 
technology “organises a situation of choice” that has not existed before.6 By 
inducing a new possibility, the technology produces a “moral dilemma” to cope 
 
4 Carl Mitcham: Responsibility and Technology. The Expanding Relationship, in: Paul T. 
Durbin (Ed.): Technology and Responsibility, Dordrecht 1987, p. 3. 
5 Kurt Bayertz: Increasing Responsibility as Technological Destiny? Human Reproductive 
Technology and the Problem of Meta-Responsibility, in: Paul T. Durbin (Ed.): Technology and 
Responsibility, Dordrecht 1987, p. 135. 
6 Peter-Paul Verbeek: Moralizing Technology. Understanding and Designing the Morality of 
Things, Chicago, IL 2011, p. 5. 
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with. It infiltrates, so to speak, peoples’ former realm of responsibility and urges 
them to choose whether to employ the test and how to deal with its results. 
Verbeek writes conclusively (our emphasis):7  
The very fact that this technology makes it possible to know that it is very 
likely that a person will become ill, added to the possibility of preventively 
removing organs, makes this person responsible for his or her own 
disease.  
We consider this view – that technology predominantly raises questions 
about responsibility (whom to blame) and that the creation of technology increases 
our responsibility including the potential to be blamed, sanctioned or punished, if 
things go wrong – the Olympian view on technology. The gist is clear: technology 
increases possibility, which in turn increases responsibility. The thesis is 
substantive because there is no logical bind between novel possibilities and new 
responsibilities. So, why do the Olympians assume one to grow with the other?  
First, Olympians are impressed by the idea that technology makes possible 
actions that were impossible before. In public discourse, emerging technologies are 
often eagerly expected, hailed, and feared precisely for this reason. The debate 
within the philosophy of technology is no different. Technology is discussed 
because it offers new possibilities. In a classic contribution, Bayertz considers in 
detail Fletcher’s (1974) discussion of new reproductive possibilities, where he 
depicts how “the age-old mode of human reproduction via coital intercourse… 
ending in birth, today can be backed up by seven alternative modes of procreation,” 
amongst them artificial gestation of a foetus in an artificial uterus and egg 
transfer from one woman to another.8 Today, the expanding possibilities of 
reproductive technologies excite the passions and imagination of enthusiasts and 
critics alike.9 Likewise, the prospect of future drone wars, to name another 
 
7 Verbeek, Moralizing Technology, p.  5. 
8 Bayertz, Increasing Responsibility, p. 136. 
9 Jennifer A. Doudna, Samuel H. Sternberg: A Crack in Creation. Gene Editing and the 
Unthinkable Power to Control Evolution, New York, NY 2017. 
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example, provokes contemporary scholarship.10 Not only does technology seem 
worth to be considered and discussed because of the novel possibilities it creates: 
Technology’s nature might consist of creating novel possibilities.11 
Second, Olympians claim that increased possibilities imply increased 
responsibilities. We are, writes Bayertz, responsible for anything that we 
anticipate but do not control.12 He seems to recount Prometheus’ myth: with the 
increased possibility, “we have lost our innocence; there is, whether we like it or 
not, no way back to the paradise of irresponsibility”13 (1987: 146) and indeed he 
predicts a “multiplication of responsibilities.”14  
Similarly, consider Jonas’ argument: We must carefully consider nuclear 
weaponry because it entails the possibility to destroy our planet completely. The 
view’s Kantian fundament is obvious: If it is impossible that we ought to do 
something if we cannot do something, one may be inclined to accept the Olympian 
view wonder whether the fact that we can do something implies that we ought to 
do it. Once something has been an option for us, the fact that we do not do it, has 
to be justified. 
3 Olympic Problems 
Below the compelling surface of the Olympian view lie treacherous depths that 
make for Olympian problems. A closer look reveals the vagueness of the Olympian 
thesis in two crucial ways. It is opaque regarding what kind of possibility 
technology creates. And, once clarified, it turns out that our responsibilities would 
increase with technological advancement to a point where we would be unable to 
satisfy them, leading to an absurd conclusion. 
The thesis of increasing possibilities through technology is oblivious of the 
differences between (logical) possibilities and (human) capabilities and the fact 
 
10 Robert Sparrow: Killer Robots, in: Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24 (2007), I. 1, pp. 62-
77. 
11 Franssen, Lokhorst, van de Poel, Philosophy of Technology. 
12 Bayertz, Increasing Responsibility, p. 146. 
13 Bayertz, Increasing Responsibility, p. 146. 
14 Bayertz, Increasing Responsibility, p. 140. 
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that not everyone is a beneficiary of technological progress. The Olympians are in 
dire need of a more precise notion of technological possibility.  
The common-sense notion of possibility refers to what might happen, what 
might exist, or be true. In practice, we constrain the generic notion of possibility 
to reflect narrower concerns. It is often pragmatically clear that the possibility of 
meeting a married bachelor is different from the possibility to driving down a one-
way street the wrong way (conceptual vs legal possibility), which is yet different 
from the technological possibility to cross the Atlantic in less than eight hours.15 
However, the ordinary meaning of the notion of technological possibility is 
futile: It refers to the things that technology enables us doing, and so new 
technology enables us to do new things, which is another way of saying that 
technology creates new possibilities for action. Currently, philosophers lack a 
precise notion of technological possibility that captures how new possibilities arise. 
To illustrate, consider physical and epistemic possibilities, which might, in 
contrast to logical possibilities, be alterable by technology. On David Lewis’ widely 
accepted theory, which understands possibility in terms of possible worlds, 
technology realises pre-existing possibilities, possibilities that transcend human 
limits and technological capacities.16 Thus, the existence of possibilities is 
independent of any particular place, person, or time of the actual world. While 
there is a sense in which it is impossible for us to destroy the world (and difficult 
even for the likes of Trump and Putin), the physical possibility is there, and it has 
been there all along – in a different, conceivable world. Technology did not create 
it.  
Olympians might object that we misinterpreted the relationship between 
possibility and responsibility: It’s not about doing new things, it’s really about 
thinking them. Consider the opening lines of Robert Frost’s The Road Not Taken: 
“Two roads diverged in a yellow wood / And sorry I could not travel both” (Frost 
 
15 Henry S. Richardson:Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Cambridge 1997, p. 145. 
16 David Lewis: On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford 1986. 
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1920).17 The crossroad forces a decision upon the raconteur that induces the 
responsibility to justify her choice. The decision remains up to her: Had the 
raconteur faced two thousand paths, the existential nature of her choice, and 
culpability, would be the same.18 Technology does not create new possibilities, but 
it enables us to re-describe acts in previously unavailable fashion.19 We are 
inclined to approve this argument.  
However, Olympians cannot endorse such view, because it suggests the mere 
appearance of increased possibility (and, hence, responsibility) and Olympians 
base their view on the actual expansion of possibility. Olympians might try to 
invoke the notion of ‘real possibility’ to capture the idea of branching possibilities 
in a metaphysical rather than epistemic sense. At any given moment, given that 
moment, real possibilities represent alternative ways for the future to unfold: each 
can be actualised, but none is actual yet. However, the analysis of real possibilities 
has just begun,20 and, crucially, we lack an understanding of how real possibilities 
are created. Without such an account, the Olympian claim that technology creates 
possibility remains vague.  
Moreover, novel technologies rarely create possibilities for all of us. Many 
people do not benefit from the aforementioned possibility of air travel, because 
they cannot afford it. Most technologies, including genetic testing, nuclear power 
and air travel enlarge the scope of action and the impact of a limited number of 
people. Others have to go without them. At best, technology creates possibilities 
for us, that is, at the collective level. In that case, the Olympians should be talking 
about realising rather than creating possibilities, and not on the individual, but 
on the collective level (for only then are general claims about novel possibilities 
 
17 Robert Frost: The Road Not Taken, in: Robert Frost, Mountain Interval, New York, NY 
1920. 
18 Jean-Paul Sartre: Being and Nothingness. An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology. Edited 
by Hazel Estella Barnes, New York, NY 1993, p. 669. 
19 Donald Davidson: Agency, in: Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 
1980, pp. 43–61. 
20 Thomas Müller, Antje Rumberg, Verena Wagner: An Introduction to Real Possibilities, 
Indeterminism, and Free Will. Three Contingencies of the Debate, in: Synthese 196 (2019), I. 1, pp. 
1-10. 
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generated by technology true). However, current philosophy of technology is 
focused on the individual level, dissecting individual responsibilities, and thus 
currently utterly inconclusive when it comes to determining for whom exactly and 
how responsibility increases due to the growth of possibilities.21 People whose 
mobility hasn’t increased in the past decades aren’t responsible for rectifying the 
environmental damage caused by it. What, then, really is the value of the 
Olympians’ global thesis about the growth of responsibility, if employed so broadly 
and imprecisely?  
These problems with possibility might be dismissed as mere technicalities. 
However, even if the notion of possibility could be made precise, there is a grave 
problem with the Olympians’ view of responsibility as it eventually demands to 
put a halt on technological development. As the Olympians assert, since we can 
anticipate and control technological development, we have to bear the brunt for 
technological catastrophe and accidents. With technological progress, there are 
always new responsibilities, which require novel technological (or institutional) 
solutions to solve, which, in turn, create new responsibilities, ad infinitum. But 
only gods can bear this burden – our human capabilities appear to limited to deal 
with the ever-increasing responsibility implied by the Olympian view. To be 
consistent, the Olympian view must call a halt to technological development, a 
conclusion that we consider absurd.  
The problem with satisfying our spiralling responsibilities originates from 
our limited human capacities. Consider, someone is planning to go out with friends 
on Saturday evening. The person promises some friends from high school, whom 
she has not seen in a while, to meet up for dinner. Accidently, another friend from 
college also calls her and asks to meet up, which she promises to do after dinner 
the other group. Chance has it that some further friends contact her on the same 
evening driven by the same motivation to meet up. Clearly, at some point, she 
must stop promising all of these parties to meet because she cannot possibly keep 
 
21 Martin Sand: Futures, Visions, and Responsibility. An Ethics of Innovation, Wiesbaden 
2018. 
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all of these promises. With each promise, as with each new technology, her 
responsibility grows. 
In the same way, in which we expect her to end making promises, we must 
put a halt to the development of new technologies. Indeed, we have a responsibility 
to manage our responsibilities in such a way that we do not take on too many 
responsibilities, which are possible to satisfy individually, but impossible to satisfy 
collectively. Thus, there exists a meta-responsibility to keep manageable our 
responsibilities. We have seen that, on the Olympian view, responsibilities 
increase. Given the limits to what we, as individuals, can do, it is inevitable that 
a continued increase of responsibility in line with continuing technological 
progress will at some point surpass our capacity to live up to our responsibilities. 
Whether we know when this point is reached or not, in each case our meta-
responsibility demands that we put a halt to technological progress at some point 
(and sooner rather than later, if the threshold is opaque).  
At this point, Olympians might retreat to a more elaborate version of their 
view. ‘True’, they might say, ‘responsibilities increase with possibilities created by 
technology, but that does not imply that our responsibilities must overwhelm us – 
technology might just help us to satisfy them, ad infinitum.’ Resembling the 
worries about moral overload,22 technology tends to the problems it creates. We 
don’t dispute that this is a logical possibility. However, epistemically, we are in 
foggy territory, and it is uncertain whether new technological possibilities will 
help us to satisfy what responsibility demands. The safest way to ensure keeping 
up with our responsibilities is, therefore, to put a halt to technology. Of course, 
Olympians might recant the claim that technology indeed creates novel 
responsibilities. But, they cannot recant completely, for that would mean to give 
up their core Olympian commitment. Alternatively, they have to defend a 
workable distinction between possibilities created by technology and a sense in 
which technology opens up courses of action without introducing novel 
 
22 Jeroen van den Hoven, Gert-Jan Lokhorst, Ibo van de Poel: Engineering and the Problem 
of Moral Overload, in: Science and Engineering Ethics, 18 (2011), I. 1, pp. 143-155. 
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responsibilities. In the absence of such a distinction, we must assume that one 
grows with the other, which yields the absurd consequence outlined above.  
So, technology, wither now? Though this conclusion truly reflects the morale 
of the Greek fable, it is not what contemporary Olympians have in mind. These 
Olympian problems, hoisted from below the view’s compelling surface, encourage 
the search for an alternative.   
4 The Promethean View of Responsibility 
In the previous section, we have argued that responsibility itself requires – 
metaphorically speaking – that Prometheus’ torch shall be returned to the gods, 
to manage the ever-increasing demands of responsibility through growing 
technological power. The meta-responsibility from which this requirement follows 
puts a halt to a regressus, whose consequences eventually could not possibly by 
shouldered by finite beings like us. If the traditional emphasis on responsibility is 
right, the answer to the question ‘What technology?’ sooner or later has to be: 
‘None.’  
But, we promised a more accurate picture of the relationship between 
responsibility and technology. Our view turns the traditional approach that says 
technologies first and responsibility second upside down: We assert that 
responsibility comes first and technologies second. With this in mind, the meaning 
of the question ‘What technology?’ turns out to be a response to responsibility and 
not at its beginning. Prometheus did not encumber humankind (and himself) with 
responsibility by sharing the powers of light; he first embraced his responsibility 
through his action.  
Clearly, in this argument, we implicitly introduced a distinction between two 
different notions of responsibility. Prometheus was punished by the Olympians, 
which is a type of backward-looking responsibility. Backward-looking 
responsibility emerges as the interpersonal practice of holding someone liable or 
accountable by blaming or punishing her if harm occurred or a misdeed has 
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allegedly been done.23 This most prominent form of responsibility discussed in 
philosophy is often broadly understood as the after the fact occurring request to 
provide one’s reasons for action, to answer for what has been done, like Frost’s 
raconteur. If certain necessary conditions are fulfilled (e.g. that the person has 
acted intentionally, has been uncoerced, and cannot be excused), she might be 
considered a suitable addressee for sanction or reward.24 Forward-looking 
responsibility, in contrast, does not require another person to articulate a demand 
for action or dissatisfaction with some of its consequences: The demands of 
forward-looking responsibility equal the demands of morality. Morality demands, 
for instance, that one respects other people’s dignity and keeps one’s promises and, 
hence, one is responsible for doing these things (in the future). This forward-
looking responsibility has a close resemblance with moral duties or obligations: In 
ordinary language, “X should ϕ” and “X is responsible for ϕ-ing” is often used 
interchangeably.25  
How is this related to the Promethean myth and the question ‘What 
technology?’ It can be assumed on good reason that Prometheus was initially 
motivated by a forward-looking responsibility to share the benefits of fire with 
humans and he is not alone in this regard. More generally, technologies can be 
seen as a means to adequately respond to moral demands. The imperfections of 
human nature, our vulnerability, the existence of disease, hunger, death and 
natural catastrophes pose a constant threat to well-being.  Technology is not only 
accompanied by responsibility and creates new moral dilemmas, as the Olympians 
suggest, but it is also first and foremost a response to these shortcomings and 
external threats. Innovators, scientists and engineers throughout the centuries 
embraced a forward-looking responsibility – a duty – to challenge those 
shortcomings and annihilate external threats by constructing new technologies. 
 
23 Ibo van de Poel: The Relation between Forward-Looking and Backward-Looking 
Responsibility, in: Nicole A. Vincent, Ibo van de Poel, Jeroen van den Hoven (Eds.): Moral 
Responsibility. Beyond Free Will and Determinism, Dordrecht 2011, pp. 37-52. 
24 John Martin Fischer, Neal A. Tognazzini: The Physiognomy of Responsibility, 
in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82 (2011), I. 2, pp. 381–417. 
25 Michael J. Zimmermann: Moral Luck. A Partial Map, in: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 
36 (2006), I. 4, pp. 585–608. 
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By opening new ways to solve moral dilemmas technologies help us to live up to 
our responsibilities and overcome certain limitations: If the person from the 
previous example promises to several different people to meet up on the same 
evening, advanced infrastructures and vehicles will make it possible, at least to a 
certain extent. 
Even the “Modern Prometheus”, Viktor Frankenstein, protagonist of Mary 
Shelley’s famous novel, begins his studies with the noble motivation to “banish 
disease from the human frame and render man invulnerable to any but a violent 
death,”26 a motivation that later ceases as Viktor loses oversight and succumbs to 
his absorbed and egoistic temper. Nowadays, it is not unusual to hear 
entrepreneurs and innovators exclaim that “they’re trying to ‘make the world a 
better place’ and that they’re committed to wiping out some dread disease.”27 Such 
inclination has probably accompanied engineering endeavours since its 
beginnings.28 Promethean aspirations are often intended to increase human 
flourishing. They can be seen as, and should be, a result of a call for responsibility 
and not only as their cause.  
Of course, we are not suggesting that all technologies are in fact engineers’ 
responses to moral calls. Too often, engineers have openly admitted following the 
call of market demands instead of morality. In 2008, the company Kitchen Craft 
advertised a rotating (battery-driven) ice cream cone. The device, sold in the UK, 
allegedly “helps avoid drips on hot days, as well as saving the tongue effort.”29 The 
value for human flourishing and welfare of such ‘innovation’ is nil, but the 
absurdity of the example only strengthens the normative side of the Promethean 
view. 
Also, technologies are not always the best means to challenge human 
vulnerabilities and the threats of mother nature. Instead, they sometimes appear 
 
26 M. V. Shelley: Frankenstein. Or: The Modern Prometheus, London 1989, p. 47. 
27 Steven Shapin: The Scientific Life. A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation, Chicago, 
IL 2008, p. 312. 
28 Samuel C. Florman: The Existential Pleasures of Engineering, St Martins, NY 1996. 
29 Andy Bloxham: Rotating Ice-cream for Lazy Lickers, in: Telegraph (2008). 
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literally like the sledgehammer to crack a nut: In the debate about anti-ageing 
technologies, some authors, for instances, wittily objected to defenders of a moral 
responsibility to develop life-extension technologies,30 that the average life 
expectancy can already be increased through non-technological means by 
distributing education, health care and wealth more equally, as these have a 
significant impact on life expectancy.31 No matter how one stands regarding this 
issue, it is obvious that technologies are not always the best solution to a problem, 
and that not everything perceived as a problem by engineers and philosophers 
requires a (technological) solution. Other examples of this kind are space tourism 
and space colonisation, technological visions which are advocated latest since the 
1970s.32 Until today, these visions are critically discussed in terms of feasibility 
and desirability: Many opponents of these technologies suggest that there are 
more urgent problems to be solved than offering a solvent minority the opportunity 
to experience zero gravity. Also, critics assert that colonising other planets is too 
risky and costly to be considered an adequate response to threats such as climate 
change which can be managed more easily with the right mindset.33 The 
controversies surrounding these technological visions underline the need to 
discuss the surplus-value of new and emerging technologies before they are 
produced, no matter how morally worthwhile the initial motivation to create them 
has been. 
Having arrived at a more adequate and comprehensive picture of the 
relationship between technology and responsibility, we see why the question 
‘What technology?’ is off the track. If responsibility comes first and technology 
second, then the question ‘What technology?’ has absorbed the moral impetus that 
early champions of technologies motivated to seek new inventions. The slogan 
 
30 Nick Bostrom: The Fable of the Dragon Tyrant, in: Journal of medical ethics 31 (2005), I. 
5, pp. 273-277. 
31 Martin Sand, Karin Jongsma, Toward an Ageless Society, in: E. Dominguez-Rue, L. 
Nierling (Eds.): Ageing and Technology. Perspectives from the Social Sciences, Bielefeld 2016, pp. 
291-310. 
32 W. Patrick McCray: The Visioneers. How a Group of Elite Scientists Pursued Space 
Colonies, Nanotechnologies, and a Limitless Future, Princeton, NJ 2013. 
33 Kelly C. Smith, Keith Abney: The Great Colonization Debate, in: Futures (2019). 
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“Responsibility first, technology second” is an expression of this early impetus. If 
this impetus should come to something, the previously discussed examples send a 
strong reminder to ask ‘Why technology?’ before asking ‘What technology?’ Before 
starting to build new artefacts and things and also before starting to produce these 
new technologies by embedding values in design and shaping innovation processes 
in a certain manner, we first have to analyse the shortcomings of humans and the 
threats with which humans are confronted in-depth and evaluate and rank these 
problems according to their significance. A thorough analysis of these issues to 
which technology allegedly provides the solution should reveal whether this is 
actually the case and whether non-technological means have a more desirable. 
This is the crucial imperative of technological responsibility, a forward-looking 
responsibility to ensure the increase of human well-being. This Promethean view 
challenges the idea that new technologies are a silver bullet to fix everything, and 
it does so because the belief in the silver bullet will eventually, as argued before, 
lead to its demise: When we cannot shoulder these responsibilities infinitely, we 
have to put a strict halt to technological development: Responsibility demands 
that. The question ‘Why technology?’ gains its significance as current philosophers 
of technology advocate to embed relevant values into the design of new 
technologies (VSD) or recommend to make the process of innovating more 
inclusive, anticipatory, and transparent, an idea that resides prominently in 
debates about European Research Policies. Reciting the Olympians’ dictum, 
Jeroen van den Hoven, who promotes value-sensitive design, argues that 
innovations “expand the set of relevant, feasible options regarding solving a set of 
moral problems.”34 
However, whether innovations are ever the right means to solve these moral 
problems is here uncritically endorsed: When aiming to improve the process of 
innovating and embedding values in design, the question ‘Why technologies?’ has 
already been answered in technologies’ favour, thereby putting more weight on 
our shoulders which are already heavily burdened with technological 
 
34 Jeroen van den Hoven: Value Sensitive Design and Responsible Innovation, in: J. R. 
Bessant, Maggy Heintz, Richard J. Owen (Hg.): Responsible innovation. Managing the Responsible 
Emergence of Science and Innovation in Society, Chichester 2013, p. 82. 
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responsibility. Becoming more aware of this is an essential aspect of our forward-
looking moral responsibility. 
5 Conclusion: Prometheus’ legacy 
Our answer to the question of ‘What technology?’ prompts a fundamental change 
of perspective on the relation between responsibility and technology. We must 
concentrate on (forward-looking) collective responsibilities to halt global warming, 
to fight poverty, and to end hunger and war, which suggests what technology one 
ought to create.  
Who determines what our collective responsibilities are, and who should 
guide technological development? Prometheus legacy illuminates this question, 
too. Consider Stephen Fry’s account of Zeus’ desire to punish Prometheus:35  
A voice within [Zeus] seemed to whisper that one day, no matter what 
vengeance he took, mankind would reach ever upwards until they came level 
with the gods – or, perhaps more terribly, until they no longer needed the 
gods and felt free to abandon them. No more worship, no more prayers sent 
up to heavenly Olympus. The prospect was too blasphemous and absurd for 
Zeus to entertain, but the fact that such scandalous idea could even enter 
his mind served only to fuel his rage.  
The gods’ authoritarian way in deciding who is worthy of using technology 
stands in the way of a democratic approach to identify what our collective 
responsibilities are, which problems ought to be prioritized and whether, and what 
technologies are the right means to do so. Neither gods nor philosophers alone 
should have the last word on these issues – we do. ‘We’ are the engineers, the 
lawmakers, the philosophers, the citizens and we must determine what 
responsibilities what technology ought to fulfil.  
In conclusion, Prometheus’ legacy calls for a political philosophy of 
technology, one that helps us to ascertain our collective responsibilities, and the 
means for addressing them. 
 
35 Stephen Fry: Mythos. The Greek Myths Retold, London 2018, p. 131. 
